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Abstract 
With the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis, a huge threat and disaster had been 
brought to the European Union, the member states and the entire euro zone. The 
ongoing financial crisis has made it very difficult or even impossible for some 
member states within the euro zone to re-finance the government debt without the 
third party‘s assistance.  Greece being one of those states is experiencing the biggest 
economic threaten in the national history. In order to ‗save the country‘, the Greek 
government signed series of agreements, memorandums with the other members 
states and organizations. The result is promising for it prevented Greece from a 
sovereign default. It seems that everything goes the way that Greece wants. But in 
order to receive the money, what is the price for the Greek government to pay?  Is it 
truly as beautiful as it looks? 
 
 
Key words: the European sovereign debt crisis, European Union, euro zone, third 
party‘s assistance. 
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Introduction  
From the year 2009, the entire euro zone started to experience the biggest 
economic recession in the history. Several member states of the Eurozone were 
severely damaged by the debt crisis that they may face a situation of sovereign default. 
The ongoing crisis even challenged the whole structure and institute of the European 
Union. In order to save the distressed member states of the Eurozone and to remain 
the stability of the Eurozone, a series of efficient measures had been taken during 
2009-2012. The measures had made great efforts to the control of the sovereign debt 
crisis. Yet, they are also being questioned by infringing the European Union law, the 
constitution of the member states or both
1
. In this thesis, I will discuss the 
infringement both on the EU level and the member states‘ level. 
In the first part of the thesis, I will give a general legal analyze about the 
sovereign debt crisis, including a brief overview of the debt crisis, and the measures 
that had been taken so far (not all the measures), after that, I will talk about the 
legality of the measures, especially focus on the infringement of ART.125 TFEU—the 
no-bail-out clause.in addition, i will bring in the ―Pringle‖ case to further discuss the 
legality of the measures. 
In the second part of the thesis, I will take Greece as an example, arguing that the 
measures had been taken so far has already intervened in the internal affairs of Greece. 
And it also infringed the sovereignty of Greek people. In order to achieve that, at the 
beginning, I will introduce the concept of sovereignty from a legal perspective. Then I 
will discuss sovereignty on EU level---including the debate of sovereignty within the 
European Union and the different features of sovereignty among the member states. 
As in the following parts, I will go into details--the legislations of the constitution of 
Greece, specifically the procedure of ratifying and implementing a law in Greek 
constitution to make it clear that how signing the agreements and memorandum with 
the other Member States and international organizations breached the popular 
sovereignty of Greece. Then, I will argue about whether Greece should call for the 
state necessity or not, not only because the state is experiencing the biggest economic 
                                                 
1 For the argument see Adamski, National Power Games and Structural Failures in the European Macroeconomic 
Governance, CMLRev. 2012, pp. 1219-1364; Athanassiou, Of Past Measures and Future Plans for Europe‘ s Exit 
from the Sovereign Debt Crisis: hat is Legally Possible  and hat is Not ,EL ev. 2011, pp.558-575 ;  uffert, 
 he European Debt Crisis and European  nion Law, CML ev. 2011, pp. 1777-1806;  omuschat,  he Euro   A 
Fortress Threatened from Within, in: Ligustro/Sacerdoti (eds.), Problemi e Tendenze del Diritto Internationzale 
Dellʼ Economia, Liber amicorum in onore di Paolo Picone, 2011, pp. 275-297 
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disaster, which could tear down the entire state‘s economic structure, but also what the 
Greek government had done already violated the Greek people‘s free will-----the 
popular sovereignty. 
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Part I : Analysis of the European sovereign debt crisis 
1.1 A general overview of the EU sovereign debt crisis  
The EU sovereign debt crisis, A.K.A the euro crisis (actually not a currency crisis) 
started in the year 2009. It began in Greece when the new Greek government revealed 
its budget deficit on the 5
th
 of November, which was surprisingly large that it was 
actually twice as much as what the country had disclosed( the precise number was 
12.7% of GDP). The large deficit directly led to the situation that the debt of Greece 
had been downgraded. The situation had gone even worse in 2010, when the 
downgraded- Greek debt was widely sold by the bondholders. In order to stop the 
threatening financial crisis, Greece came up with a round austerity measures (which 
had been proved to be a failure). The ongoing debt crisis had spread rapidly to other 
euro zone member states, including Ireland, Portugal, etc. The sovereign debt crisis 
had led to a crisis of confidence for European business and economy, and made a 
serve influence to the entire euro zone, which led to the fact that, without a third 
party‘s help, some euro zone member states ( such as Ireland, Greece, Portugal) could 
not be able to re-finance or pay back the government debt. What was the reason that 
caused the EU sovereign debt crisis? Scholars and experts from different fields had 
given out reasons from different perspectives: the lack of budget discipline in the 
European Union Member States, the lack of European regulations to cut the high 
budget deficit, the evidential justification cannot meet the demand of social budget 
spending, last but not least, the lack of European institution actions to against the 
states that have not fulfill the measures to join the euro currency. 
So far, several solutions to sovereign debt crisis have been raised: First of all, In 
order to avoid the crisis spreading and threatening to other member states which has 
not been damaged, rescue packages have been provided to the distressed member 
states of the euro area. Secondly, to avoid the future risk, the debtor made the loans 
conditional to force the creditor to take structural reform and economic austerity. 
Thirdly, since there is flaw in the original institutional framework of EMU, the 
framework needs to be reformed. Last but not least, since the reacted insufficient 
when the debt crisis unfold, the former European financial market regulation called 
for a re-construction. 
These are the possible solutions response to the debt crisis, but would whey work 
properly under the scope of the European Union law? The truth is it would come up 
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with certain difficulties. Firstly, it would absolutely meet obstacles when trying to 
amend a treaty, because member states have different procedures to amend a treaty, 
which is very difficult to meet everyone‘s demand. Besides, even a treaty is already 
been amended, there is still a possibility that the treaty may infringe the constitution 
law of the member states. Secondly, due to the limitation of ART.5 TEU, it would be 
impossible for the European Union to come up with secondary legislation to against 
the debt crisis as a whole. Thirdly, we cannot neglect the existence of the flaw in the 
framework of EMU. 
Because of those obstacles, it seems that the solutions would be difficult to be 
put into practice, so the distressed member states called for extra EU measures. 
1.2 Measures and rescue, stabilization efforts 
In order to stop the wild spread debt crisis, and help the deeply trapped member 
states of the euro zone pass the long depression winter, a series of measures had been 
taken by the European Union, EU member states, international organizations. So far 
has made great efforts to the entire euro zone and European Union that it helped the 
EU prevent a disorderly sovereign default. Although came out with promising results, 
but it does not change the fact that the measures that had been taken are controversial: 
Is there enough legal framework or legal basis to support those measures? Or in other 
words, were the measures that had taken so far legal under the EU law or national law 
of the member states? Before answering the question, let us look back at the measures 
that had been taken so far. 
During 2010 to 2012, a series of measures had been taken, so as to response to 
the debt crisis. And help the deeply trapped euro zone member states to get through 
the debt crisis. The measures are as follows: 
1.2.1 Direct financial assistance to the member states of the euro zone 
In order to prevent several member states of the euro zone (including: Greece, 
Portugal. Ireland) from a sovereign default, a series of financial assistances have been 
provided by the member states, the European Union, International Monetary Union 
(IMF),  European Central Bank (ECB). Among these distressed member states, 
Greece is the one that had profited the most form the direct loans. In May 2010, a 
package of loan of 110 billion euro was granted to Greece (A.K.A the First Greek 
bail-out). The 110 billion euro was divided into two parts: 80 billion euro was sharing-
provided by the other member states of the euro zone which did not have a sovereign 
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default problem. Meanwhile the other 30 billion euro was provided by the IMF. In 
order to avoid the possible risk in the future, the loan was provided under strict 
conditions, which means only if Greece meets the measures of the conditions, 
otherwise the loan would not be provided. In addition, the entire loan-program was 
strictly monitored and operated by the IMF, ECB, European Union Commission 
 A.K.A. ―the troika‖ .  he first direct loan could not save Greece from the severe 
recession, so another direct loan package was granted to Greece on the early 2012. 
Only this time the loan was provided by private creditors.  
 1.2.2 The European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) 
The EFSM is a mechanism aiming at providing financial support to the member 
states that are in difficulties, which is caused by the circumstances that are out of 
control of the member states. The legal framework of the mechanism is based on an 
EU regulation that under ART. 122(2) TFEU( Ex ART. 100 TEC). The wording of 
ART.122(2) are as follows: 
―2. here a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe 
difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, 
the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, 
Union financial assistance to the Member State concerned. The President of the 
Council shall inform the European Parliament of the decision taken.‖2 
The EFSM is an intergovernmental agreement that established by the EU council 
regulation NO.407/2010. According the regulation, the EU commission is granted the 
power to collect the money and provide the financial assistance only if the threatened 
or damaged member states fulfill the requirements that formulated in the regulation 
(including the procedure of application, disbursement and so on). 
1.2.3 The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
In June 2010, a more important part of the rescue program was established---the 
European Financial Stabilize Facility (EFSF).the EFSF is a temporary  facility that 
aiming at providing financial aids in the forms of loan facility agreement or loan at 
max 440 billion euro, with conditions to the distressed member states of the euro area-
----―…It is envisaged that financial support to euro-area Member States shall be 
provided by EFSF in conjunction with the IMF and shall be on comparable terms to 
                                                 
2 See, See,‖ CONSOLIDA ED VE SION OF  HE   EA Y ON  HE F NC IONING OF  HE E  OPEAN 
 NION‖- A  .122 2 . Available on the website ―http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Lex riServ/Lex riServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF‖ 
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the stability support loans advanced by euro area Member States …‖3 ( The Greece 
problem was solved by bilateral loans) 
The EFSF is established under the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg private law by 17 
member states of euro area based on an intergovernmental treaty. Apart from the 
EFCM, the legal framework of the EFSF is not based on the EU law (ART.122). It 
consists of framework agreement and articles of incorporation. It is also further 
developed by different guidelines which are listed out by boards of the EFSF, the 
guidelines formulate the different financial instruments. All the member states of the 
euro area are the shareholders of the EFSF. The boards are considered to be the head 
of the EFSF, which means that it both represents all the euro member states and makes 
the decisions of the EFSF. 
One thing should be clarified that: the EFSM is available to both euro member 
states and non-euro member states, while the EFSF is only available to the euro 
member states 
1.2.4 The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
On October the 8
th
 2012, a permanent crisis resolution mechanism was legally 
established—The European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The need for setting up the 
ESM is because all the efforts that had been taken during 2010 to 2011 to stop the 
sovereign debt crisis were very difficult for the market itself to re-gain the confidence. 
With a close cooperation with the IMF, the ESM is aiming at providing financial 
assistance to the member states of the euro area who is dealing with financial 
difficulties. The financial assistance will be provided to the member states with strict 
economic policy by making proper use of the following instruments:‖… Providing 
loans in the framework of a macroeconomic adjustment program; ... Purchasing debt 
in the primary and secondary debt markets; … Providing precautionary financial 
assistance in the form of credit lines; … Financing re-capitalizations of financial 
institutions through loans to the governments of ESM Members…  he ESM will be 
empowered to directly re-capitalize banks in the euro area once an effective single 
supervisory mechanism for euro area banks is established.‖4 
In general, the ESF will‖ …assume the tasks currently fulfilled by the European 
Financial Stability Facility ("EFSF") and the European Financial Stabilization 
                                                 
3 See, EFSF FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT—paragraph (2),text available on‖ 
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/20111019_efsf_framework_agreement_en.pdf 
 
4 See,‖ The scope of activity of the European stability mechanism‖, available on the website‖ 
http://www.esm.europa.eu/#. 
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Mechanism ("EFSM") in providing, where needed, financial assistance to euro area 
Member States.‖5 The difference between the ESM and the EFSF is that: the ESM 
was set-up as an international institution, under public international law. It was 
granted with legal personality from the beginning, and capital stocked of 700 billion 
euro. While the EFSF was on the other hand operated as a legal person, it was set up 
under the Luxemburg private law. Being different from the ESM, the bonds of the 
EFSF are guaranteed by the governments of the member states of the euro area. 
The ESM is considered to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a 
whole. The agreement between the member states came up the 2
nd
 of February 2012, 
but due to the a long process of ratification (especially in Germany), the establishment 
of the ESM did not come into force until the 8
th
 of October 2012
6
---the member states 
of the euro area agreed to amend ART.136 TFEU by adding an additional paragraph –
―paragraph 3‖:‖  he Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a 
stability mechanism to be activated if indis-pensable to safeguard the stability of the 
euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the 
mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality.‖7 The legal frame work of the 
ESM is formulated by the ―  EA Y ES ABLISHING  HE E  OPEAN 
S ABILI Y MECHANISM‖, signed by 16 member states of the euro area. 
1.3 The no-bail-out clause 
The measures that have been taken so far made a great effort dealing with the 
sovereign debt crisis within the euro area. It helped the distressed member states re-
finance the government debt and prevent (but not totally) them from a serious 
sovereign default. Although it is still a long way to go for the market and the investors 
to re-gain the confidence, but the results come out so far are definitely promising. 
With all due respect, the measures are also being questioned by infringing the 
European Union law, national constitution or both. Before gong any further, let us 
take a look at how the measures being questioned by infringing the European Union 
law (noted that there are other infringements and legal issues in the sovereign debt 
                                                 
5 See,‖   EA Y ES ABLISHING  HE E  OPEAN S ABILI Y MECHANISM‖, available on the website‖ 
http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/esm_treaty_en.pdf‖ 
6 See, Ohler, The European Stability Mechanism: the long road to financial stability in the euro area, GYIL (2012), 
forthcoming. For a analyze including more details. 
7 See,‖ E  OPEAN CO NCIL DECISION of 25 March 2011-―amending Article 136 of the  reaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose currency is the 
euro‖, available on the websit‖http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:091:0001:0002:EN:PDF 
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crisis, in thesis, we just focus on the infringement of ART.125 TFEU and the 
infringement of the Greek constitution which will be discussed in the second part). 
The main controversial issue is that the financial assistance provided by the 
EFSF and ESM may infringe ART.125 TFEU. ART.122 TFEU authorized the 
European Union to provide the financial assistance to the member state if a member 
state is in difficulties, the wording of A  .122 2  is as follows:‖…a Member State is 
in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural 
disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial assistance 
to the Member State concerned…‖8. Since the financial assistance of the EFSF and 
the ESM were provided by the government of the euro area, then ART.122(2) is not 
valid. 
The wording of ART.125 states as follows: 
―1.  he  nion shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central 
governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by 
public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual 
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall 
not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or 
other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings 
of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the 
joint execution of a specific project. 
2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, may, as required, specify definitions for the application of the 
prohibitions referred to in Articles 123 and 124 and in this Article.‖9 
According to the interpretation of ART.125 TFEU, any measures that taken by 
European Union or the member states, which provide financial assistance to other 
member states, would be prohibited. But the question is whether we should strictly 
follow the verbatim, or an extensive interpretation should be required? 
 here is no doubt that A  .125 would prohibit any forms of ―bail-out‖ to the 
member states based on its latter interpretation. But it is also undisputed that the 
principle of the entire section of the economic policy is aiming at approaching an 
open market economy with free competition, favoring an efficient allocation of 
                                                 
8 See,‖ CONSOLIDA ED VE SION OF THE TREATY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN 
 NION‖- ART.122(2). Available on the website ―http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Lex riServ/Lex riServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF‖ 
9 See,Id-ART.125 
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resources, and in compliance with stable prices, sound public finances and monetary 
conditions and a sustainable balance of payments
10
. Among ART.120 to ART.126, 
ART.122 and ART.125 (along with ART. 143) shows that the European Union is 
aiming at setting up an independent market that all the member states could finance. 
Meanwhile, precise rules on fiscal discipline are strictly regulated by ART.126.
11
 
The purpose of setting up ART.125 was to ensure that the member state which 
does not strictly follow the rule of the European Union would not be saved by the 
union (a perfect example is the situation of Greece in the sovereign debt crisis). But a 
―negative‖ reading of the treaty, which would jeopardize the stability of the Eurozone 
and the single currency, is either helpful or convincing. Now more appropriate 
arguments had been raised up. One is that voluntary- loans are not being covered by 
ART.125. The other is that since the treaty could not foresee an emergence as the 
sovereign debt crisis, the emergence measures that already stated in the treaty 
(ART.126) should be re-considered and formulated
12
. It is the long-term finance 
which supported by the ESM that breached ART.126, because it is lack of fiscal 
discipline. It is not the financial assistance that infringed the rules. 
1.4 The “Pringle” case 
A landmark case of the European  nion‘s constitutional development during the 
sovereign debt crisis is the case ― homas Pringle V. Government of Ireland, Ireland 
and the Attorney General‖13  A.K.A. the ―Pringle‖ case .  he Pringle case solved the 
compatibility between the ESM Treaty and the European Union law, and proved that 
the ESM Treaty is valid. 
Mr. Thomas Pringle, an individual and independent member of the Irish 
parliament applied to the Irish High Court in order to restrain the Irish government 
from the ratification of the ESM Treaty. Mr. Pringle argued that the ESM Treaty 
infringes European Union law (ART.125, TFEU—the ―no-bail-out clause) and 
encroaches the role of European Union in economic policy and monetary policy. In 
addition, the ESM is a new institution that has been set up under public international 
law, which is not only out of the reach of the EU law, but also lack of accountability 
                                                 
10 See, Id-ART.119(3), ART. 120 
11 See, L. Knopp, 63 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1777, 1779 (2010); see,also, U. Häd e, 20 Europäische 
Zeitschrift für  Wirtschaftsrecht 399, 403 (2009) 
12See, J.-V. Louis, 47 Common Market Law Review 971, 985 (2010); C. Herrmann, 21 Europäische  Zeitschrift 
für Wirtschaftsrecht 413, 415 (2010). 
13 See, C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General. 
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and democratic control. Mr. Pringle also argued that since the EU treaties are part of 
the Irish constitution, the ratification of the ESM Treat by the Irish government 
infringes the national constitution. He challenged the E  government‘s ―March 2011 
decision‖ by saying that ―to change a legal provision in a treaty  adding a third 
paragraph to A  .136,  FE   to allow the ESM to be created was incorrect.‖ 
Mr. Pringle did not succeed, so he appealed to the Irish Supreme Court. The 
supreme court made the judgment on 31, July 2012. In the judgment, based on the 
Irish law, the supreme court rejected Mr. Pringle‘s application and constitutional 
challenge. And then the Irish Supreme Court upheld the reference of preliminary 
ruling to the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU), along with three questions 
which related to the European  nion law.  he questions are:‖ 
1) Whether European Council Decision 2011/199/EU of 25th March 2011 (1) is 
valid…? 
2 …is a Member State of the European  nion whose currency is the euro 
entitled to enter into and ratify an international agreement such as the ESM Treaty? 
3) If the European Council Decision is held valid, is the entitlement of a Member 
State to enter into and ratify an international agreement such as the ESM Treaty 
subject to the entry into force of that Decision?‖14 
Because of the ―uncertainty as to the validity of that treaty‖15 and ―…to remove 
as soon as possible that uncertainty, which adversely affects the objective of the ESM 
treaty, namely to maintain the financial stability of the euro area.
16‖  he ECJ decided 
to take an accelerated procedure on 4 10 2012, for it normally would take 1 to 2 years, 
which is no good for the control of the ongoing crisis. The full court of 27 judges 
attended at the same time to consider the  challenge, which was consider to be 
extraordinary, for it was the first time in the history that the ECJ used the full court in 
a case referred by a national tribunal. The ECJ gave the judgment on 21 11 2012. In 
the judgment the ECJ proved that the ESM treaty is valid and there are no problem 
                                                 
14 See, Reference for a preliminary ruling from Supreme Court (Ireland) made on 3 August 2012 — Thomas 
Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General. Text available on the website‖ http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Lex riServ/Lex riServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:303:0018:0019:EN:PDF‖ 
15 See‖, O DE  OF  HE P ESIDEN  OF  HE CO   ‖.4 October 2012 (*),(Accelerated procedure),order,7. 
text available on 
―http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30db57774ff134e343399983e1273
54ae11d.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuKbxb0?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=DOC&docid=1
28422&occ=first&dir=&cid=581740 
16 See‖, O DE  OF  HE P ESIDEN  OF  HE CO   ‖.4 October 2012 (*),(Accelerated procedure), order 7, 
text available on 
―http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30db57774ff134e343399983e1273
54ae11d.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuKbxb0?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=DOC&docid=1
28422&occ=first&dir=&cid=581740 
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about the compatibility between the ESM Treaty and the European Union law. The 
ECJ also answered the three questions that referred to the Irish Supreme Court. 
In the following parts, I will examine the answers which are related the 
―simplified procedure and the infringement of A  .125  FE . For more details about 
the answers to all the three questions, please see the ―judgment of the court‖  full 
court)
17
. 
In the judgment, the answer for the question, the ECJ states:  For the first 
question,‖… when they undertake a revision of the FE   reaty using that simplified 
procedure, comply with the conditions laid down by that provision…‖18which means 
if a simplified procedure is about to taken, there are certain conditions are required to 
be meet. In the following part the ECJ stated two conditions as‖… the simplified 
revision procedure concerns ‗revising all or part of the provisions of Part  hree of the 
[FEU] Treaty, relating to the internal policies and actions of the  nion‘.19 The second 
condition is:‖… [t]he European Council may adopt a decision…such a decision ‗shall 
not increase the competences conferred on the  nion in the  reaties‘…‖. 20Then the 
ECJ stated that‖…to examine the validity of a decision of the European Council based 
on Article 48 6   E … the procedural rules laid down in Article 48 6   E  were 
followed‖.21  o that end, the first condition is met. In the following part, ―…the 
amendments decided upon concern only Part Three of the FEU Treaty, which implies 
that they do not entail any amendment of provisions of another part of the 
 reaties …and that they do not increase the competences of the  nion.‖22 So the 
second condition is met as well. 
The infringement of ART.125 TFEU, in the judgment, the ECJ started with the 
interpretation of the A  .125.  he ECJ stated that‖… that article is not intended to 
prohibit either the Union or the Member States from granting any form of financial 
assistance whatever to another Member State.‖ 23 Then the ECJ brought ART.122 and 
ART.123 to support the reading of the ART.125. Firstly, within the interpretation of 
A  .122, the ECJ emphasized that:‖… If Article 125  FE  prohibited any financial 
assistance…Article 122  FE  would have had to state that it derogated from Article 
                                                 
17 See, JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Full Court),27 November 2012 (*) text available on‖ http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Lex riServ/Lex riServ.do?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0370:EN:H ML‖ 
18 See, Id—paragraph 33. 
19 See, Id—paragraph 34. 
20 See, Id 
21 See, Id—paragraph 35,36. 
22 See, Id—paragraph 36. 
23 See, Id—paragraph 130. 
 12 
125  FE .‖ 24Secondly, the ECJ compared the word using in ART.123 and ART.125, 
and clarified that the word used in ART.123 is much stricter than ones used in 
A  .125.  hen the ECJ stated that‖…  he difference in the wording used in the latter 
article supports the view that the prohibition stated there is not intended to prohibit 
any financial assistance whatever to a Member State.‖ 25Thirdly, the ECJ tracked back 
to the original resource of the prohibition that states in A  .125 is actually from‖ 
Article 104b of the EC Treaty (which became Article 103 EC), which was inserted in 
the EC  reaty by the  reaty of Maastricht.‖26 According to the Treaty of Maastricht, 
the ECJ provided that‖… the aim of Article 125  FE  is to ensure that the Member 
States follow a sound budgetary policy…the prohibition laid down in Article 125 
TFEU ensures that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when 
they enter into debt…Compliance with such discipline contributes at  nion level to 
the attainment of a higher objective, namely maintaining the financial stability of the 
monetary union.‖27 
Last but not least, the ECJ referred to the ESM  reaty, it stated that‖… the 
instruments for stability support demonstrate that the ESM will not act as guarantor of 
the debts of the recipient Member State, The latter will remain responsible to its 
creditors for its financial commitments.‖ 28  In addition, the ECJ noted that‖… 
assistance amounts to the creation of a new debt, owed to the ESM by that recipient 
Member State…‖29 
The ratification of the ESM Treaty before the entry into force of Decision 
2011/199, To answer the third question, the ECJ emphasized whether the amendment 
of the decision confirms the existence of a power possessed by the Member States, 
along with the reading of paragraphs 68, 72 and 109 of the judgment, the ECJ noted 
that‖… decision does not confer any new power on the Member State.‖30 Then the 
ECJ came out with the conclusion that ―…the right of a Member State to conclude 
and ratify the ESM Treaty is not subject to the entry into force of Decision 
2011/199.‖31 
The ART.125 TFEU (the no-bail-out clause) was interpreted in many different 
                                                 
24 See, Id—paragraph 131. 
25 See, J DGMEN  OF  HE CO     Full Court ,27 November 2012  *  text available on‖ http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0370:EN:H ML‖--paragraph 132. 
26 See, Id—paragraph 134. 
27 See, Id—paragraph 135. 
28 See, Id—paragraph 138. 
29 See, Id—paragraph 139. 
30 See, Id—paragraph 184. 
31 See ,Id—paragraph 185. 
 13 
ways before the ―Pringle‖ case, which could be sum up to three main ways, as in 
―verbal, purposive, and ultima ratio‖32. During the case, the ECJ had to use all the 
three main ways of interpretation to approval the compliance between the ESM and 
ART.125 TFEU. According to the judgments, the ECJ also set out three requirements, 
which are supposed to be satisfied. The requirements are: firstly, the member states 
which accept the financial assistances must hold the commitment to the creditors. 
Secondly, the financial assistances would be only provided under strict conditions. 
Lastly, the financial assistances would be only provided as to safeguard the financial 
stability of the Eurozone as a whole. 
Several arguable issues had been raised up by the interpretation of ART.125 of 
ECJ. In the upcoming part, I will focus on one important issue, that Is, the collective 
reading of ART.122 and ART.123, in order to support the interpretation of ART.125 in 
the judgment. 
In the judgment, by analyzing ART.122(2) and comparing the wording of 
A  .123, the ECJ stated that‖ A  .125 did not prohibit all kinds of financial 
assistances, meaning, certain forms of financial assistances are allowed. The question 
is: Did ART.122(2) and ART.123 truly support the conclusion of ECJ about ART.125? 
According to the judgment, the ECJ emphasized that:‖... If Article 125  FE  
prohibited any financial assistance…Article 122  FEU would have had to state that it 
derogated from Article 125  FE .‖33 But the truth is ART.122 and ART.125 are two 
equal provisions of the treaty, which means the two provisions should be reconciled 
with each other. Besides, ART.122 was not set up as an exception either. In the 
declaration No.6 of the treaty of Nice, the relationship between ART.122 and ART.125 
had been regulated as‖… decisions regarding financial assistance, such as are 
provided for in Article 100 (now Art. 122) and are compatible with the no-bailout rule 
laid down in Article 103  now Art. 125 …‖34 
In addition, to apply for ART.122 TFEU, a quaint balancing is required
35
. A more 
appropriate relationship between ART.122 and ART.125 should be considered as: the 
assumption is formulated in ART.125, while the exception to the assumption is yet 
regulated in ART.122(2). But still it would not lead to the interpretation that all other 
                                                 
32 See, ―Special Section The ESM Before the Courts--The ESM and the European Court‘s Predicament in Pringle. 
Vestert Borger, page129-130, available on: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol14-
No1/PDF_Vol_14_No_1_113-140_ESM%20Special_Borger.pdf 
33 See, J DGMEN  OF  HE CO     Full Court ,27 November 2012  *  text available on‖ http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Lex riServ/Lex riServ.do?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0370:EN:H ML‖-paragrapg 31 
34 See, Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts, decl. 6, March 10, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 78. 
35 See, ‖For an elaborate discussion of how to carry out this balancing exercise‖, Louis, supra note 35, at 983–85 
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forms of financial assistance would be covered by ART.125, except the circumstances 
that had been already regulated in ART.122(2). It could be considered as: only if 
ART.125 is being regarded, otherwise the European Union would not be authorized 
the legal power to provide the financial assistances. In addition, in ART.125 further 
information about the financial assistances which provided by the member states 
cannot be found. 
Similar to the situation of reading of ART.122, there is not adequate evidence 
could be found in ART.123 to support ART.125 which had set up a restricted scope. 
According to the comparison of ART.123 and ART.125, the ECJ indicated that since 
the wording in ART.123 is much stricter than the wording used in ART.125, logically 
it should be considered that not all the financial assistances were prohibited by 
A  .125.  he truth is the ECJ‘s conclusion is somehow an indication which is lack of 
legal basis support. 
It is certainly arguable that a restrictive reading of ART.125 is being required by 
the wording of ART.123, for the monetary financing somehow can do certain damage 
to the stability of the price. Meanwhile, the prohibition that the ECB and central bank 
of the member states cannot provide credit to public sector, at the same time, does not 
apply to the European Union and the member states. The truth is: the central banks are 
more eager to launch the EMU, due to the strict wording of ART.123, which also led 
to another situation of credit arrangement for public authorities during the member 
states. All in all, the wording in ART.123 was originally and yet much more intended 
to regulate the specific nature of central banks along with their position, which means 
the wording certainly could not support the interpretation of ART.125. 
Conclusion about the ―Pringle‖ case: It was rather pragmatic than theoretic that 
the ECJ had given the judgment to the ―Pringle‖ case, for it was mostly intended to 
give a fast and efficient response to the ongoing debt crisis, which is still a huge 
threaten to the stability of the euro area. To this extent, rejecting all the challenges 
which brought up by Mr. Pringle by the ECJ had come up with a dominant reason. 
But the lacks of constitution had also been pointed out in the judgment, due to the 
nature of the ESM, which is an intergovernmental institute set up under public 
international law, which is not only out of the reach of the EU law, but also lack of 
accountability and democratic control. The approval of the compatibility of the ESM 
with the EU treaties at the time seems to be the most efficient way to deal with the 
sovereign debt crisis. For back to the beginning when the sovereign debt crisis 
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unfolded, the provision in the EU treaties did not support adequate legal basis for the 
member states.  he ECJ‘s judgment emphasized the supremacy of E  law as well.  o 
sum up, the judgment of the ECJ did provide sufficient legal principles and political 
pragmatisms to meet the demand of safeguarding the financial stability of the euro 
area as a whole. 
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Part Ⅱ:The infringement of Greek constitution 
During the EU sovereign debt crisis, Greece is one of the member states, which 
is not only been seriously damaged, but also the one profited the most from the 
―rescue-package‖. During February to May 2010 the first bail-out), the Greek 
government had signed a series of agreement with the other member states and 
international organizations, so as to save the state from an economic eruption. 
According to the agreements, in order to get the money form the financial assistance, 
Greek government had to amend certain law to the national constitution. The 
ratification and implementation were considered to be infringing the Greek 
constitution and violating the popular sovereignty. In the following part, I will go into 
details to reveal how such infringements and violation had been done in the name of 
―saving the country‖. Before that several concepts need to be clarified first, including 
the concept of sovereignty, the sovereignty debate within the European Union. 
2.1 The understanding of sovereignty 
In the traditional concept, sovereignty is usually automatically considered as a 
state that being completely independent and being fully recognized within the 
international community. ―Acting completely independent as well as being regarded 
by the other states‖, this concept of sovereignty is traditionally being understood as 
―external sovereignty‖. It means a state that has its legal authority, and not under 
control of any power of any other states 
2.2.1 External and internal sovereignty 
Normally,‖ traditional Sovereignty‖ can be easily measured. Meaning if a state 
itself can act independently on the international level to other states and the ―acting 
―can be regarded by the other but not all states.  hen the state can be considered 
sovereign.  hat is usually to be considered as‖ external sovereignty‖ Meanwhile, 
there is another traditional term that closely related to external sovereignty. And that 
is‖ internal sovereignty‖. Internal sovereignty usually being understood as: within the 
territory, the state itself has a clear, ultimate power that can maintain itself stable. It 
can be challenged by other bodies or communities. Comparing the two concepts of 
sovereignty, we can see that the external sovereignty is way clear than the internal 
sovereignty. All in all, no matter under what circumstances, in order to be sovereign, a 
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state must be able to make the public maintain stable within its territory, and the 
authority should be willingly respected by most of the nationals. 
Since the traditional understanding of the concept of sovereignty can always be 
put into two ways: sovereignty can be exercised both in the relationship to one‘s 
external and internal affairs.in history there is always a connection between the 
internal and external sovereignty, in another word: the two forms of sovereignty are 
seriously bound to each other. Even though the two forms of sovereignty are bound to 
each other, it is still important to distinguish the concept between the two. Firstly, 
sovereignty normally can be exercised in two ways by different institutions: Usually, 
in internal affairs the legislative is considered as sovereignty. While in external affairs, 
executive is usually be seen as sovereignty. Sometimes the real difficulty lies in the 
telling the difference between national sovereignty and parliamentary sovereignty.
36
 
Secondly, the functions of internal and external sovereignty are different as well. 
Speaking of external sovereignty of one state, it is usually related to the question of 
cooperation within absolute sovereign entities. While internal sovereignty within one 
state is often related to either legal or political matters. Last but not least, the internal 
sovereignty is usually considered as final, while the external sovereignty cannot be 
easily been seen as ultimate or final, because a sovereign can only co-exist as in a 
equal to other sovereigns within a state,
37
 only under this circumstances, the external 
sovereignty can been seen as equal ultimate. 
The two forms of sovereignties cannot be separated in practice. Even though 
there are clear differences in the concepts.
38
 The two forms of sovereignty are closely 
bound to each other: where there is internal sovereignty, there is external 
sovereignty.
39
 Without external sovereignty, the internal sovereign cannot define the 
latter and without the internal sovereignty in the constitutional determination of 
competence, there cannot be external sovereign and no human rights limitation in 
particular.
40
 However it is hard to place one in front of another in case of emergence.
41
 
in the European context this issue is particularly relevant. Different from the federal 
                                                 
36See‖ Debates about sovereignty in the United Kingdom, for instance, tend to conflate both kinds of sovereignty.‖  
37 Art.2(1) of the united nations Charter guarantees the principle of sovereignty and the equality of states. See 
Bleckmann, 1994, n.6. 
38 See MacCormic, 1999, 129 who distinguishes internal fromexternal sovereignty and considers that the latter can 
exist in the absence of the former. 
39 On this notion of ‗Relationsbegriff‘, see Rhonheimer, 1989, 263. See also Loughlin, 2003 on the importance of 
the relationship between those who govern and those governed. See also Walker, 2003a; Aalberts, 2004, 37 
40 SOLANGE 1 IN 1974, BVerfGE 37, 271; solange2 in 1986, BVerfGE 73,339; Maastricht Urteil in 1993, 
BVerfGE 89, 155 
41 See Pfersmann, 2001, 38-39 on this double determination of external sovereignty. See also Bleckman, 1994, n. 7 
and 11; James,1999,464 
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states, the European Union was not created through the gradual concession of member 
states‘ external sovereignty. 42  There is a saying that the only matter should be 
concerned within the European context is internal sovereignty.
43
 To some extent, it 
somehow underestimates the close bond between the internal and external sovereignty. 
With less internal sovereignty, the external sovereignty is affected as well and 
gradually shrunk at national level.
44
 
2.2 The Sovereignty debate of EU 
2.2.1 The sovereignty of EU 
Does the European Union have sovereignty or not? This is a question that has 
been raised since the early days when the European Union was founded. The debate 
has been going on up till now. To answer the early question, perhaps we should solve 
one question in advance, that is: how are we going to describe the European Union? 
The official describes the European Union as: 
―…an economic and political union of 27 member states that are located 
primarily in Europe. The EU operates through a system of supranational independent 
institutions and intergovernmental negotiated decisions by the member states.‖45 
The core of EU law is based on the original treaties. But there is no formal 
fundamental law  for example: constitution law . It made the E ‘s legal nature remain 
uncertain. In addition, the European Union consists of 27 member states, among 
which, most of their national legal system refers to civil law, which means the case 
law does not operate the same force as statue. 
Clearly the European Union is definitely different from the traditional form. The 
nature of the EU is so unique that we can hardly describe it in a precise way: Firstly, 
the EU is not a state, because the EU does not fulfill the measurements and limitations 
of either internal or external sovereignty. The EU does not have that much sovereign 
power.‖…Its inability to determine autonomously the form and substance of its own 
political existence distinguishes it from a state‖46. Secondly, the European Union is 
clearly not an international organization either. Because it somehow has too much 
sovereign authority that it cannot be consider as an organization-― he sovereign 
authority it exercises with direct effect in member states distinguishes it from ordinary 
                                                 
42 See Pfersmann, 2001, 37, eiler, 2002 
43 MacCormic, 1999, 133; MacCormic, 1996, 553 
44 Art.1-27 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty on the establishment of an EU Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
45 "Basic information on the European Union". European Union. europa.eu. Retrieved 4 October 2012. 
46 see ―Supremacy of E  Law: A Comparative Analysis‖, author, AISI ZHANG .published on 5th of October 2012. 
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international organizations.‖47 
Scholars have different opinions about the description of the EU. Some say that 
the European Union is an emerging system consisting of multiple- level- governance. 
In the whole functioning system, due to the basic spirit of making efforts to the EU, 
―the governments of the member states are actually losing the influence in both 
subnational and supranational.‖48Some other scholars rather consider the European 
Union as a combination of a sovereign state and an international organization.
49
 Some 
scholars even criticize that: along with the non-stop enlargement to the European 
Union, the EU can be seen more of a neo-medieval empire than a strength type of 
united -state.
50
 
As discussed above. The nature of the European Union is so complicated to 
describe. So it is not easy to say whether it has sovereignty or not. Some say it does 
have sovereignty some say it does not. The debate is still going on. In my opinion, to 
see the sovereignty on EU level, the concept of the sovereignty must be different from 
the traditional point of view. The sovereignty of EU must be understood as a whole 
new concept apart from the nation/state sovereignty, because the European Union is 
such unique ―united states‖. Doctor Adrián  okár believes that the European  nion 
does have sovereignty. In his paper he argues that the EU does have sovereignty, he 
compared the different understanding of ―power‖ and ―force‖, Balanced the E  
supremacy and the member state‘s domestic legislation, using different measurements 
to make the statement clear. In his paper he states: 
―…the E  does have sovereignty in a legal sense; it creates legal norms that are 
superior to legal norms of the member states…  he member states do not enjoy legal 
supremacy in areas entrusted to the E …the enforcement rests with the member 
states; however, in the majority of cases E  measures are complied with…‖51 
2.2.2 Pooling sovereignty 
Since the nature of the European Union is still uncertain (as we discussed above). 
Then the debate about whether the European Union has sovereignty or not will still be 
                                                 
47 4 Grimm, Dieter, ―European Court of Justice and National Courts:  he German Constitutional Perspective after  
the Maastricht Decision‖, 3 Colum. J. Eur. L. 229 (1996-1997). At 53 
48 Mark A. Pollack, ― heorizing the European  nion: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment  
in New Governance‖, Annu.  ev. Polit. Sci. 2005. 8:357-98. 
49 1 Prof. Karel Klima, ― he Constitutional Legal Nature of the European  nion‖, orkshop Papers for VIIth 
World  
Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, No.4. 
50 Jan Zielonka, ―Europe as Empire:  he Nature of the Enlarged European  nion‖, Oxford  niversity Press, 2006. 
51 see ―I M Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, Vol. XI‖, published 2nd of November, 2001 by the author 
Adrián Tokár 
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carried on for a long time. Since the European Union consists of 27 independent 
sovereign states, then a new way of saying the sovereignty in EU has been raised—
―pooling sovereignty‖. 
Before we go even further, let us take a look at the legislation of the treaty first. 
In the ― reaty on European Union (former name-―Maastricht  reaty‖  A.K.A‖ E ‖,52 
A  .4 2 says‖ The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall 
respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the 
State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, 
national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.‖53 It basically 
says that: after the European Union being founded, the sovereignty of the member 
states are still being respected and protected under the treaty, which make it sound 
really equal. There are many different features in the member states. In order to found 
a much stronger economic and political union, and maintain it stable, the European 
Union will respect the different features and let the member states keep them under 
the new functioning structure. But the question is if the member states fully keep their 
different features, there will be conflict between the member states and the European 
Union. 
In order to solve the problem above, A  . 4 3   E  states that:‖ Pursuant to the 
principle of sincere co-operation, the  nion and the Member States shall…assist each 
other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall 
take any appropriate measure … to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of 
the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. In addition: 
―… he Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the  nion‘s tasks and 
refrain from any measures which could jeopardize the attainment of the  nion‘s 
objectives.‖54 ART.4 did not go into details, it just generally says that the European 
Union and the member states will mutually respect and co-operate with each other. To 
fulfill that expectation, the member states have duty to operate, and facilitate 
achievement of the  nion‘s task. It does sound really equal. Because in ART4 TEU, it 
carries out the relationship of co-operation between the European Union and the 
member states, and the relationship is mutual. Based on ART4 TEU, the sovereignty 
                                                 
52 See‖ Maastricht  reaty‖  7 February 1992  CVCE 
53 See the textbook of ― HE   EA Y ON E  OPEAN  NION ―- ART.4(2) 
54 See the textbook of ― HE   EA Y ON E  OPEAN  NION ―- ART.4(3) 
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of the member states is being respected and protected. Is that all the truth? 
In the European Union, it is not possible for a single state to change a single 
European law. ―Pooling sovereignty‖ in E  is intended to strengthen one member 
state‘s resource in the way of joining them with the others. In practice, ―pooling 
sovereignty‖ means: in order to make the decision which related to specific matters of 
joint interest democratically on EU level, the member states have to give up parts of 
the decision-making-power to the shared institutions that they have created.  
In the global context, no state can act independently on most issues, and pooling 
sovereignty somehow has made great objections to be achieved. So the ―pooling 
sovereignty‖ is a better way to solve the debate of the sovereignty within the 
European Union then? 
Member states which agrees or sacrifices their sovereignty to the European 
Union thought that they may somehow increase their sovereignty in practice on EU 
level. But the truth is they lost more than they got. First of all, they did sacrifice their 
national sovereignty to the European Union, for the EU has supremacy over national 
law of the member states. Secondly, in the way of limiting or abolishing the national 
veto power (especially in the EU sovereign debt crisis), the EU continually reduces 
the power of ―weaken‖ or ―small‖ member state in the situation of decision-making. 
In addition, the member states which are much stronger in the politics and economy 
become more and more powerful in the condition of making policy or decision to 
specific matters. 
2.2.3 Supremacy of EU law 
In order to enhance the concept of a‖ new legal order‖,55 the European court of 
justice developed the supremacy of European Union law. As a matter of fact, what 
interesting is that: the supremacy of the European Union law itself does not have any 
formal basis in any of the European Union Treaties. A famous case that brought out 
the debate between the national law of the member state and the European union law 
is the Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 (6/64).
56
 The main issue about the 
case Flaminio Costa v ENEL was that there was a conflict between the European 
union‘s legal provision of the free movement of goods and the member state‘s national 
law on the national electricity monopoly. In the judgment of the case, the European 
                                                 
55 see‖ Judgment of the Court of 5 February 1963. - NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van 
Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. - Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tariefcommissie 
- Pays-Bas. - Case 26-62.- ―new legal order‖ 
56 See‖ Flaminio Costa v ENEL ―[1964] EC  585  6/64  
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court of justice had established three states which made it very clear that supremacy 
rule over the national law of the member states. First of all, "the EEC Treaty has 
created its own legal system which…became an integral part of the legal systems of 
the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply."
57
 Secondly, Member 
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus 
created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.
58
 Last but not 
least,‖  he executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another 
in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the 
objectives of the Treaty."
59
 Nowadays, from the E ‘s perspective, the issue between 
the conflicting national law of the member states and the supremacy of the EC law is 
that ―...under the principle of supremacy, precedence must always be given to 
Community law over conflicting national law however framed and including national 
constitutional provisions.‖60 
How did the ECJ developed the doctrine of the supremacy of EU over the 
national law of the member states is by setting up a series of important rulings step by 
step: 
1) In the case ―Van Gend en Loos[1963] EC  1‖61.the ECJ established that the 
EU is an independent legal order that being from the member states. 
2) hen come along with the landmark case ―Costa v ENEL[1964] EC  58562, in 
that case, The ECJ firstly introduced the doctrine of the supremacy of the EC law. 
3)In 1970, it was the case‖ Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] EC  
1125‖63 that established the EU law is supreme over the provisions of the domestic 
constitutional law fo the member states. 
4)In 1978, in‖ Simmenthal[1978] EC  629‖ 64 , The ECJ emphasized that 
―supremacy of EC law strongly affects the legislation in prior and the future. 
5)In 1990, in‖ Factortame[1990] EC  I -2433‖65. It made the obligation of the 
member states even more clear that the national law should be ignored if there was a 
conflict between the EU law and the national law. 
6)In 1996, in order to warn the government of the member states of the 
                                                 
57 See ―Flaminio Costa v ENE‖L [1964] EC  585  6/64 -judgement. 
58 See‖Flaminio Costa v ENEL ―[1964] EC  585  6/64  
59 See‖Flaminio Costa v ENEL‖ [1964] EC  585  6/64  
60 See,‖  he National Court‘s Mandate in the European Constitution, Hart Publishing 2006, pg.  
559. author, Monica Claes 
61 See ―Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen‖  1963  Case 26/62 
62 see‖ Flaminio Costa v ENEL‖ [1964] EC  585  6/64  
63 See‖ Internationale Handelsgesellschaft‖ 11/70 [1970] EC  1125 
64 See  C-106/77,” Simmenthal II “[1978] ECR 629 
65 See‖ Factortame‖[1990] ECR I -2433 
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consequence of breaching the E  law, in ―Brassiere du Pechier 66  and Factorame 
(No.4)[1996]2 WLR 506
67‖ the ECJ announced that the government will take the 
financial loss as in the result of breaching the EU law. 
According to Enchelmaier, Stefan, the doctrine of the supremacy is addressed as 
follows:‖ in case, and to the extent, of irreconcilable results in the application of both 
legal systems to the same situation, the conflicting national law of member states 
becomes inapplicable.‖ 68  It means if there is a conflict in between the domestic 
legislation and the EU law, EU law rule over the national law of the member states. 
The reason that ECJ determined that the supremacy of EU law operate over 
national law is to make sure that when a conflict appears, it is the EU law that should 
be the one to apply. It is also saying in Craig.‖ P and G. De. Burea‖ ‗s book ―since the 
aim of creating a uniform common market between different states would be 
undermined if Community law could be made subordinate to the national law of 
various states.‖69 . Well, although the ECJ can grant the EU law the authority to run 
over the domestic legislation of the member states. But most of the member states did 
not consider the doctrine of the supremacy unconditionally. Some member states did 
not really accept the‖ new legal order‖ which developed by the ECJ, especially when 
this‖ new legal order‖ is found being against the domestic constitutional legislation. In 
other words, the ECJ might have the supremacy (also addressed as the primacy) over 
national statues, but it cannot be against the member states‘ constitutional law  which 
seen as the foundation of the domestic legal structure). There had been arguments 
going for years since the doctrine of the supremacy had been developed. Some 
member states‘ national courts even claim  after the ECJ emphasized the doctrine of 
supremacy of EU law) that: the ECJ do not have the ultimate power to rule the 
competence between the national law and the EU law. The decision should be left for 
member states to decide. They hold the ultimate power. 
2.2.4 The features of sovereignty in different EU member states 
—   The sovereignty of the Hungarian republic 
During the early days, there was no such concept of sovereignty in Hungary. The 
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67 See‖ Factorame ―(No.4)[1996]2 WLR 506 
68 See  ―Supremacy and Direct Effect of European Community Law Reconsidered, or the Use and  
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sovereignty didn‘t come up as a problem of constitutional law, because back to the 
kingdom days , in the 16
th
 century , the term‖ doctrine of the holy crown‖70 was 
widely accepted in the state. The doctrine of the holy crown was a combined theory 
based on the glory and power of the crown, and the theory of an amalgam of medieval 
organic state. And the ―doctrine of the holy crown‖ has maintained for centuries. 
After the World War Ⅱ, as the kingdom came to an end .  he widely spread ―the 
sovereignty of the ‗working people‘‖ had replaced the ―doctrine of the holy crown‖ in 
Hungary. And it stayed for decades. 
In 1989, a referendum on details of transformation played an important role in 
the set-up of the new democratic system. The transformation to the rule of the law has 
put the ―popular sovereignty‖ into the front. It seemed to be working really well until 
a referendum on a constitutional amendment was initiated in 1999. As the referendum 
came out, the popular sovereignty seemed like a threat to the present constitutional 
system during that time. Since then, in order to solve the sovereignty problem, 
Hungarian government has adopted a solution which is very close to the‖ German 
Agent Solution‖.71  he ―German Agent Solution‖ can be understood as ―Sovereignty 
definitely belongs to the people, but the way that how people use it is different, people 
could not just use it directly. Instead, the sovereignty was being guarded in a bank 
vault, so it would not be risky for the owner to use it. only the agents that either from 
the Parliament or be chosen from the parliament has the power to use the sovereignty, 
the bank that in charge of the protection and the agent that selected to use the power 
were all ―watched‖ by the German national constitutional court.  o sum up, the 
German agent solution is that it is the parliament of Germany that actually has the 
power to use sovereignty, only that power is being used under the name of the entire 
state‘s people.  he entire procedure of using the sovereignty was under surveillance, 
just to make sure that the power was not being infringed. 
--- Parliamentary sovereignty in the United Kingdom 
The official of the United Kingdom consider the parliament of sovereignty as a 
principle in the  K‘s constitution.  hey state the parliament sovereignty as follow: 
―Parliamentary sovereignty is a principle of the  K constitution. It makes 
Parliament the supreme legal authority in the UK, which can create or end any law. 
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Generally, the courts cannot overrule its legislation and no Parliament can pass laws 
that future Parliaments cannot change. Parliamentary sovereignty is the most 
important part of the  K constitution.‖72 In the United Kingdom, the fact is that the 
British constitution law is often described as 'partly written and wholly uncodified', 
because the legislation of the constitution law does not exist in the test. As a matter of 
fact large parts of the constitution law have already been written down, much of the 
constitution law were written in the statute law. Over the years, in order to limit the 
application of parliamentary sovereignty, the British Parliament has made a few 
Effective legislation come into force. These laws made influence in political 
developments both internally and internationally. 
2.3 The popular sovereignty and the sovereignty of Greece 
2.3.1 Popular sovereignty  
The original resource of the popular sovereignty is the people of the state.it 
means the power comes from the people of the state. The authorities are somehow 
―signing‖ the social contract and legal bond to the people of the state.73 By signing the 
social contract, the people of the state and the political authorities are legally bond to 
each other. If the sovereign cannot bring out the popular will. Then it might be a big 
chance that it will lose its attributions. Of course, the democracy and sovereignty is 
closely bond. 
The principle of popular sovereignty brings out the advantage of bringing a clear 
connection between the politics and democracy-sovereignty. It also lies at the origins 
of the connection between sovereignty and self-determination or national autonomy.
74
 
It sets out in the European context. 
 he core of the ―popular sovereignty‖ is that the government operating at the 
present is created by majority of the people. All the power (including the legal power, 
political power, etc.) that the government has is actually from the free will of the 
state‘s people. Popular sovereignty in its nature is considered to be fundamental and 
equal to anyone that announces to be self-governing. All the power operates in the 
state‘s people in many different ways. From the concept of the popular sovereignty, 
we can see that the popular sovereignty is actually an ideal philosophy, because the 
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ultimate power belongs to every single person who made up the country equally. The 
government/ authority operating at the present, just represents the free will of the 
state‘s people.  he majorities of the people make the decision that who could 
represent them to use the power both on the internal and international level. The 
popular sovereignty also can be understood as a kind of internal sovereignty, 
generally meaning ―the ultimate source of authority within a state‖. 
We can come up with three main features from above about the popular 
sovereignty 
—The government operating at the present is created by majority of the people, 
and all power of the government comes from the free will of people. It is the people 
within a state territory that has the ultimate power (legal and political power). 
— he resource of the state‘s legislative and executive power comes from the 
will of the people and the power comes from and will exist with the people and the 
nation. 
—The nature of the popular sovereignty and the whole history of making the 
popular sovereignty show that the popular sovereignty is an ideal philosophy. 
2.3.2  The sovereignty of Greece 
According to the constitution law of Greece, it states the Greek sovereignty as 
popular sovereignty.  
Article 1  
1. The form of government of Greece is that of a parliamentary republic. 
2. Popular sovereignty is the foundation of government. 
3. All powers derive from the People and exist for the People and the Nation; 
they shall be exercised as specified by the Constitution.‖75 
We can see that the popular sovereignty is the foundation of the GREEK 
government, and it is the people of Greece that have the political and legal power. But 
there is only one question: since the popular sovereignty is kind of ideal theory, we 
are worrying about what sort of impact can it make on the Greek fundamental law---
the constitutional law. The question will be answered in the rest of the paper 
2.4 The infringement of Greek constitution 
2.4.1 The financial assistance from EU member states and 
                                                 
75 The legislation of THE CONSTITUTION OF GREECE. THE FIFTH REVISIONARY PARLIAMENT OF 
THE HELLENES RESOLVES ART.1 (1), (2), (3) 
 27 
International Monetary Found 
As I mentioned before: The state\ national\ external sovereignty usually can be 
understood as a state that has the power to act independently from an external or 
higher authority. In the case of Greece, it means that Greece is‖ sovereign enough‖ to 
sign any agreement (bailout)with the International Monetary Foundation or EU 
member states, or other international organizations. 
   Before we go any further, first of all .let us take a look back at the main 
agreements that Greece have signed with the other EU member states and the 
International Monetary Union (IMF) to save the national economy after the eruption 
of the debt crisis. During the period of May, 2010.The Greek government had sign a 
series of memorandums and agreements in order to stop the crisis and save the 
national economy. In total we call them the ―financial assistance package‖, according 
to the official announcement. 
―On 2nd of May the mission concluded a staff level agreement for a joint euro 
area / IMF financing package of EUR 110 billion and supporting economic policies. 
On the same day the Euro group agreed to activate stability support to Greece via 
bilateral loans centrally pooled by the European Commission. On 9 May the IMF 
executive board approved a Stand-By Arrangement. On 18 May 2010, the euro area 
Member States disbursed their first installment of EUR 14.5 billion of a pooled loan 
to Greece, following a disbursement of E   5.5 billion from the IMF.‖76 
The timetable is as follows: 
—2010, 5, 3rd     : The Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP)77 
                         : The memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy 
Conditionality
78
 
 —2010, 5, 8   : Loan Facility Agreement (in total 80 billion euro)79 
 —2010, 5, 9  : Stand- by Agreement with the International Monetary Fund (in total 
30 billion euro)
80
 
These were really huge supports to Greek government at that moment because 
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the nation itself was facing the biggest crisis in the history. And it seemed that the 
money just came in time .To the Greek government, it was a big relief, because under 
the heavy burden of the debt, the government could not even catch a breath. The 
officials described it as‖ unprecedented ―.  ell it looked like it was a win-win 
situation: the Greek government got help and support, and to the European Union and 
the IMF, it was a big step that they had taken to stop the debt crisis. But was it really 
as good as it looked like? 
2.4.2  The compact of the financial assistance on the Greek 
constitution 
First of all let us take a review of the ―IMF - stand - by agreement‖ 
On May 9
th
 .The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
approved a three-year SD  26.4 billion  €30 billion  Stand-By Arrangement for 
Greece in support of the authorities‘ economic adjustment and transformation program. 
This front-loaded program makes SD  4.8 billion  about €5.5 billion  immediately 
available to Greece from the IMF as part of joint financing with the European Union, 
for a combined €20.0 billion in immediate financial support. In 2010, total IMF 
financing will amount to about €10 billion and will be partnered with about €30.0 
billion committed by the EU.
81
 
The Stand-By Arrangement, which is part of a cooperative package of financing 
with the European  nion amounting to €110 billion  about  S$145 billion  over three 
years, entails exceptional access to IMF resources, amounting to more than 3,200 
percent of Greece‘s quota, and was approved under the Fund's fast-track Emergency 
Financing Mechanism procedures. To sign this agreement, what the Greek 
government should do in return was that the government has to commit the wrong 
management and the debt crisis, also commit that without the financial assistance , 
Greece can‘t put the national economy on the right track .Greece has to accept the 
financial assistance . 
 he question is ― Is the‘ IMF stand- by agreement‘ a real international agreement? 
  From a legal point of view: It is more a unilateral act than a typical international 
agreement. legally speaking ,Greece doesn‘t have to do anything from the judicial 
order, but to take the money. 
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Comparing with the ―IMF stand – by agreement‖, the ―loan Facility Agreement 
―is a typical international agreement. But there is one thing that should be notified is 
that: It is not the European Union but the rest of the member states that signed the 
agreement with the government of Greece. And Greece should do certain things in 
return. 
After examining the agreements and the Greece‘s implementation of the 
agreements, there is another question that has been raised up: Is Greek legal system a 
euro system? To make the question more clear .First of all, we have to notify one 
interesting thing .Within the E  member states. According to different states‘ national 
constitutions, the procedure of applying for an international agreement is different. 
For example: in the kingdom of Netherland. According to the Dutch constitution, 
when the government signs an international agreement, the agreement is automatically 
applicable since the moment when being signed. But in the case of Greece, the 
procedure is totally another thing. It is that when the Greek government makes an 
international agreement, in order to apply, it has to be ratified first. Then we have to 
make one thing clear—how to ratify? 
According to the Greek constitution: in the first chapter‖ S   C   E OF  HE 
S A E‖, Article 28 states as follows: 
―1.  he generally recognized rules of international law, as well as international 
conventions as of the time they are sanctioned by statute and become operative 
according to their respective conditions, shall be an integral part of domestic Greek 
law and shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law. The rules of international 
law and of international conventions shall be applicable to aliens only under the 
condition of reciprocity.‖82 
According to Art. 28(1), we know that if the rules come from the well- 
recognized international law( convention).they will be part of the Greek domestic law 
automatically. Art.28(2), (3)says: 
―2. Authorities provided by the Constitution may by treaty or agreement be 
vested in agencies of international organizations, when this serves an important 
national interest and promotes cooperation with other States. A majority of three-
fifths of the total number of Members of Parliament shall be necessary to vote the law 
anctioning the treaty or agreement.‖83 
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―3. Greece shall freely proceed by law passed by an absolute majority of the total 
number of Members of Parliament to limit the exercise of national sovereignty, 
insofar as this is dictated by an important national interest, does not infringe upon the 
rights of man and the foundations of democratic government and is effected on the 
basis of the principles of equality and under the condition of reciprocity.‖84 
From Art. 28 (2),(3) we can see under what condition a law has to be ratified into 
the constitution law of Greece, and what the procedure is in order to ratify a law. In 
the Greek constitution law part three‖ O GANIZA ION AND F NC IONS OF 
 HE S A E‖, Art.51 gives out the condition that the number of the members of the 
parliament has to reach certain amount to ratify the law. Article 51 states as follows: 
―1.  he number of the Members of Parliament shall be specified by statute; it 
cannot, however, be below two hundred or over three hundred.‖85 
―2.  he Members of Parliament represent the Nation.‖86 
From Article 28 we can see that there are actually two ways to ratify an 
agreement depending on how much sovereignty an agreement can be passed from the 
international organization. In article 28 1  we can see that if ―The rules of 
international law and of international conventions shall be applicable to aliens only 
under the condition of reciprocity.‖ In this case, it means that the international 
agreement has to be ratified before it becomes operative. In article 28 (2) we can see 
that ― when this serves an important national interest and promotes cooperation with 
other States. A majority of three-fifths of the total number of Members of Parliament 
shall be necessary to vote the law anctioning the treaty or agreement.‖87 In this case, it 
means that to ratify the international agreement, a certain number of members of 
parliament have to vote for it, and the number can be below the tree-fifths of the 
current number of the members of parliament. In article 28(3) we can see that in the 
event of transferring sovereignty, the number of the members of the parliament has to 
be absolute majority. In article 51(1), we can see that the number of the members of 
the parliament should be between two hundreds and tree hundreds. In total, in the case 
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of Greece, the number of the members of the parliament should be more than 180 or 
at least to 200. 
On May 6
th
, 2010, the Greek parliament adopts law 3845/2010 .Article 1(4) of 
law 3845/2010 provided the authorization (legal power) to the Financial Minister to 
represent the state of Greece .It legally provided the Financial Minister the authority 
to sign more multilateral or bilateral memorandum, loan conventions or international 
agreements, with the Member states of the euro zone, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, The European Central Bank, In the Article, it also said 
that ―the agreements, the conventions, the memoranda should have been brought to 
the parliament of the state for ratification. 
Two days later, without any ratification. The Greek government signed the 
―Loan Facility Agreement‖ with the International Monetary Fund. What is more 
ironic is that three days after signing the international agreement. The Greek 
parliament adopted another law-3847/2010.In the Article 9 of law 3847/2010, it 
declared that the international agreements, conventions, or memorandum containing 
in law 3845/2010 article 1 will be only brought to the parliament for discussion but 
not for ratification.  
The Greek law 3845/2010 and law 3847/2010 putting together can be understood 
as: The Greek parliament actually gave the Financial Minister the extensive and 
official authority or power to sign any agreement .convention, or memorandum. And 
he‖ legally‖ doesn‘t have to bring any of them to the parliament for ratification. Does 
it mean that the Financial Minter can do ―whatever‖ he wants beyond the state‘s 
fundamental law, just in the name of ―saving the country from the devastating debt 
crisis‖?  here is the popular sovereignty?  here is the free will of the Greek people? 
This is actually a way of being anti-constitution. 
According to the Greek official declaration, the reason why the parliament 
adopted the law was because they are trying to save the country from a collapse, 
which makes it more ironic because the Greek parliament actually adopted other laws 
to avoid the existing constitution.  as it worth it that to‖ break‖ the state‘s 
fundamental law just for the fiscal policy?  Is Greek legal system a euro system? 
In 2012, as the‖ E /IMF-Greece memorandum‖ updates, the Greek parliament 
adopted law 4046/2012. According to article 1(3) of law 4046/2012, the Greek 
parliament provided the Minister of Finance, the Prime Minister, and the chairman of 
the Greek Central Bank the authority to sign all the relevant international treaties to 
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substantiate the Financial Aid Package.  According to article 1 5  4046/2012,‖all the 
relevant treaties are deemed ratified at very moment that all the contracting parties 
sign them.‖ On one hand, the authority and the legal power is created by law On the 
other hand, it is not seen by the state‘s constitution. 
The Greek government explained that ―the highest law is the safety of the 
country.  he state‘s constitution will be meaningless if the nation falls apart 
 collapse .‖is it a sweet excuse to say that the authorities have to do things that against 
the constitution just to protect all the citizens of Greece? 
Similar case‖ Bundesverfassungsgericht‖88 happened in Germany, who was the 
biggest creditor to Greece during the sovereign debt crisis. 
During the first Greece bail-out, the‖ ährungsunion- 
Finanzstabilisierungsgesetz‖ 89  was passed by Germany to authorize the financial 
minister to grant a loan of 22.4 billion euro to Greece. In addition, in order to approval 
the rescue package legal under German law, the ―Stabilisierungsmechanismusgesetz 
―90 was adopted to provide another loan of 147.6 billion euro to Greece. 
The controversial legislation was considered to be unconstitutional and breached 
the sovereignty of the people of Germany. Furthermore, the rescue package was 
considered to be illegal under German basic law. The case was appealed to the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, which later was adjudicated by the court that 
the laws adopted in response to the rescue package were constitutional (for more 
information of the judgment, see the judgment of ―Bundesverfassungsgericht‖ . 
Two things should be noted in the case is: First of all, according to the judgment 
of the case, in order to cover the loss of the German citizen which caused by the 
adoption, certain compensation was given to the citizens by the Germany Federal 
Constitutional Court, Which not only led to the transfer of the power of sovereignty, 
but also brought out ―the willingness to encourage the rights of the German citizens‖91. 
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In the case of Greece, the popular sovereignty was breached by the Greek government 
in the name of saving the economy of the country, and the democracy was neglected 
by the Greek Government as well, yet no certain compensation had been given yet. 
Secondly, in the judgment of the case, the ―Principle of Parliament Budget‖ was 
emphasized by the German Federal Constitutional Court, which said that: any 
financial assistance which is supposed to be provided to the other member states of 
the euro area by the Federal Government of Germany, should be brought to the 
Parliament of Germany for approval first‖. In the case of Greece, the adoption of the 
memorandum and the rescue package should also be brought to the parliament for 
ratification first under the Greek Constitution, and yet the procedure had been 
neglected, and the Greek Constitution had been violated by its own government. 
2.5 Doctrine of state necessity 
The highest law is the safety of the state. From a constitutional perspective, the 
reason that the Greek parliament adopted law 4046/2012, 3847/2010, and 3845/2010 
and signed those agreements is because the stability and safety of the state is beyond 
all. By this they meant that they do not have other options but to do those things just 
in order to protect the people of Greece. 
Before we criticize the Greek Government‗s declaration .we should make one 
thing clear first: the doctrine of state necessity. 
Back to the early days, the theory of the doctrine of necessity had not been 
written down in any formal test. In the modern times, the doctrine of necessity has 
been used more in similar justifications. After Second World War, the theory of the 
doctrine of necessity was first used in a controversial judgment by the chief justice of 
Pakistan in 1954
92.  he chief justice used the doctrine of necessity as a kind of ‗extra-
constitutional‘ power to react to the situation of state emergence, and made it come 
into force after then. In the judgment 1954, it provided the doctrine of necessity the 
legal resource, which it can be put into the 1954 judgment. It was the judgment 0f 
1954 that had made the doctrine of necessity established for the first in the history. 
The Pakistani 1954 judgment is a milestone to the doctrine of necessity. After 1954, 
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the theory has since been continuously used in a certain amount of case in the 
commonwealth nations and some other places (including India, Rhodesia, Grenada
93
, 
etc.). The doctrine of necessity was latest used in Nigeria
94
 in 2010, it was used to 
justify extra-legal actions. In practice, actually the excuse of doctrine of necessity can 
be operated in two different levels: operating at the international law level and at the 
domestic law level. 
2.5.1 Doctrine of necessity at the domestic law level 
As a matter of fact, some decisions have been taken nowadays, relying on the 
concept that: the national courts are actually referring to the state necessity. But before 
any decisions been taken, two things must be clarified first: the required criteria and 
the definition of the doctrine. Necessity is being considered as a common law which 
could provide a justification against any illegal government-act in case that there is a 
public emergency in the state. It somehow builds up a significant connection between 
the actual powers of the state‘s government and the react of the authority when the 
state is under the condition of a public emergency. 
At the domestic law level, the excuse of necessity can be accepted under three 
circumstances: first of all, the ―lesser evil‖95 choice: it means when the state is under 
the condition of emergence, there is no better choice but to choose the one that is less 
harmful. Secondly, it is to balance the interests between public and individuals in 
order to reduce the loss.  hirdly, it is somehow like the ―self-defense ―, meaning: the 
necessity can be accepted when there is a reason or a case that can preclude 
wrongfulness.‖ Gregson v. Gilbert‖96 a 1783 UK case, makes a good example of 
precluding the wrongfulness. In that case a hundred and fifty slaves were pushed 
overboard due to the reason that the water was running short. 
It is a general principle that, it must be due to a good faith so that one can and 
shall apply for the doctrine of necessity. Pakistan established ― ext of Supreme Court 
Judgment on  eview Petitions‖ in 2001, in the test, the Pakistani supreme court stated 
that:‘…  he concept of the law of necessity would arise only if an act which would 
otherwise be illegal becomes legal if it is done bona fide, in view of state necessity, 
with a view to preserving the state or society from destruction‘97. The test officially 
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approved the principle of applying the necessity. The doctrine of necessity usually can 
be applied when the state is under certain condition of emergence, the ―certain 
condition‖ includes nature disasters,  such as: earthquakes, floods, etc.  or wars, 
epidemics, emergences caused by other issues, such as: the collapse of civil 
government.  
The conditions /criteria of applying for doctrine of necessity are as follows: 
1）It can be used when the state is under certain condition of emergence, the 
―certain condition‖ includes nature disasters,  such as: earthquakes, floods, etc.) or 
wars, epidemics, emergences caused by other issues, such as: the collapse of civil 
government. 
2） If the emergence in 1) appears. The necessity must be applied by a 
―constitutional organ ― organ of a state; branch of a government . 
3）Before applying for necessity, all other remedies have to be tested to be 
certain that they are not working in the case. Or there must no other remedies at all. 
4）The balance has to be considered between the measures taken and the 
circumstances causing problems within the state. 
5）The measures only should be taken temporarily, limiting it to the period of 
time that the emergence would last. 
6）Normally, a group or authority cannot apply for necessity except that they are 
considered to be good to the existence and the continuation of the emergence itself. 
7）Necessity at international law level. 
In international law, since when an emergence appears, it usually makes it 
impossible for the sates or international organizations and so on to fully meet the 
demand their obligations that they concerned. The doctrine of necessity (also 
addressed as the state of necessity) is normally aimed and used to excuse the 
wrongfulness of those states, international organizations, etc. In the customary rules 
of international law, the doctrine of necessity has been developed and addressed as 
‗defense necessity‘. 
The doctrine of necessity is being used under certain circumstance on 
international law level, that is, in order to safeguard an essential interest which is 
being threatened by grave and imminent peril, a state has nothing else but to adopt an 
act along with its international obligation to other states. The adopting an act has to be 
the one and only way to do so. In practice, there is a big chance that the doctrine of 
necessity may sometimes prohibit a certain kind of obligation, which is either an 
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obligation demanded under a bilateral investment law, or an obligation under 
international customary. It is "an exception from illegality and in certain cases even as 
an exception from responsibility.
98
" 
In 1997, the International Law Commission (ILC) gave an opinion to the case: 
‗Gabcikovo approved customary rule character of the ILC Draft Articles99100‘.  hat 
opinion has developed the doctrine of necessity on the international law level. It 
states:‖ The state of necessity is a ground that recognized by customary international 
law for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not inconformity with an international 
obligation … such ground for precluding wrongfulness can only be accepted on an 
exceptional basis.‖ 
In the 21 century, the doctrine of necessity had been further developed by the 
International Law Commission (ILC). The ILC put the doctrine of necessity into text 
by formulating‖ Draft Articles on State  esponsibility‖ in early 2000. In 2001, in 
order to make the states clearly know the responsibility of the international wrongful 
acts, the ILC adopted ―Draft articles on  esponsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries
101‖, and gave out the rules of international law in 
the text. The secondary rules of the sate responsibility had been emphasized in the 
2001‘s text book .But the articles in the text book did not give out neither the content 
of the international obligation, nor the responsibility of the breach, Because the‖ Draft 
articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries‖ is just the function of the primary rules.  
In the ―Draft Articles on State  esponsibility‖, Chapter Ⅴ , ― circumstances 
preluding wrongfulness, State of necessity‖ article 33 formulates the conditions and 
exceptions of applying for the doctrine of necessity. The article states follows: 
1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an international 
obligation of the State unless:   
(a) The act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the [*452] 
State against a grave and imminent peril; and   
(b) The act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State towards 
which the obligation existed. 
                                                 
98See‖ Continental Casualty Company v Argentine  epublic, ICSID Case No A B/03/09.‖ 
99 See ―Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros aterworks, Hungarian: Bős–nagymarosi vízlépcső, Slovak: Sústava vodných diel 
Gabčíkovo – Nagymaros‖ 
100 See‖Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project  Hungary/Slovakia ‖ 
101 See‖ draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts with commentaries 2001‖ 
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In article 33(1), it formulates the conditions of applying for the doctrine of 
necessity . 
2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding wrongfulness:   
(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in 
conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international law; or   
(b) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in 
conformity is laid down by a treaty which, explicitly or implicitly, excludes the 
possibility of invoking the state of  necessity with respect to that obligation; or   
(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state of 
necessity.
102
   
In article 33(2), it formulates the exceptions of applying for the doctrine of 
necessity. 
In the case of Greece, the Greek government couldn‘t ratify the law only if there 
is no other remedy for the current situation not apart from the international treaty and 
measure. The way that the Greek government adopted law 4046/2012, 3847/2010, and 
3845/2010 and signed those agreements with the member states and international 
organizations had already breached the constitutional law, in addition, the whole 
country is under the condition that there is a big chance that the civil government will 
collapse due to the unstoppable sovereign debt crisis. So the state necessity should be 
called for. 
                                                 
102 see―draft articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts with commentaries 2001‖ 
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Conclusion 
The sovereign debt crisis is still going on at the moment. There is still a 
possibility that the distressed member states of the euro area may face a situation of a 
sovereign default. It is somehow a paradox to give a possible solution to the sovereign 
debt crisis with breaching the sovereignty of a member states. On one hand, the 
sovereign debt crisis is the first economic recession in the European history that 
threatened the structure and institution of the EU. Dealing with this kind of economic 
eruption, EU along with the member states are honestly lack of experiences. Besides 
the EU treaties could not provide sufficient legal basis to deal the sovereign debt crisis, 
which called for a re-form. But the truth is: EU along with the member states and 
international organizations are doing their best to take measures to safeguard the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole, although the measures had been 
questioned the whole time for infringing the EU law, constitution of the member 
states or both. On the other hand, from a traditional point of view: Sovereignty is the 
priority and fundamental of one state. It does not belong to any individual, 
organization or party. A nation cannot claim to be independent without sovereignty. 
Politics, economy and other issues will become meaningless without sovereignty. In 
the democratic countries, sovereignty of democracy somehow means the sovereignty 
of the people of the state. In the case of Greece, since the Greek constitution law 
claims that the nation is based on the popular sovereignty. So all the power come from 
the people‘s free will, and will rest with all the Greek people.  he current government 
is just selected to represent the will of the Greek people. They absolutely have no 
right to deprive of the state‘s sovereignty from the Greek people. Of course the 
government cannot decide what is best for Greece by selling the state‘s sovereignty 
for money. 
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